{"id":4967,"date":"2026-10-12T16:13:53","date_gmt":"2026-10-12T13:13:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sawtoroba.com\/Eng\/?p=4967"},"modified":"2026-10-12T16:13:53","modified_gmt":"2026-10-12T13:13:53","slug":"yemen-and-the-houthis-by-dr-othman-haj-omar-tunisia-translated-from-arabic-by-ibrahim-abou-zaid-october-9-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sawtoroba.com\/Eng\/?p=4967","title":{"rendered":"Yemen and the Houthis \u00a0by Dr. Othman Haj Omar – Tunisia- Translated from Arabic by Ibrahim Abou Zaid. October 9\/2026"},"content":{"rendered":"

Yemen and the Houthis<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u00a0by Dr. Othman Haj Omar – Tunisia<\/strong><\/p>\n

Translated from Arabic by Ibrahim Abou Zaid. October 9\/2026<\/strong><\/p>\n

“The War on the Houthis”… a title that distorts the truth and the nature of the conflict.<\/strong><\/p>\n

One of the most common phrases used to talk about the war in Yemen is that it is a “war on the Houthis.” This description may seem correct at first, since the Houthis are a key party in the war. Still, it becomes misleading when it is understood that the war targets the Houthis as a social or sectarian component of the Yemeni people, or that the battle is a battle against a sect, sect, or region.<\/strong><\/p>\n

From a national perspective, the issue must be put in its proper context: Yemen is not the Houthis, and the Houthis are not Yemen.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Zaydis, as an inherent component of Yemeni society, are not a political organization or an armed militia. Therefore, confusing the social component with the political and military organization that operates in its name or from within it is not just a misstatement; it is a dangerous entry point for turning a political struggle over the State and sovereignty into a sectarian conflict.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The essence of war, at this level, is to confront an armed organization that rebels against the authority of the State, has established a de facto authority outside its institutions, and has retained military power, weapons, and decision-making independent of the institutions of the State.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Therefore, the goal of the war is not to eliminate the Houthis as Yemeni citizens, nor to uproot them from their society, but rather to end the State of rebellion, restore the unity of the State, extend its authority over the entire Yemeni territory, and end the multiplicity of centers of power, weapons, and decision-making.<\/strong><\/p>\n

This is not an exceptional issue for Yemen.<\/strong><\/p>\n

When it comes to the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq or Hezbollah in Lebanon, putting the issue in the right context also requires a distinction between the Shiites as an authentic national and social component and the armed organization or formation that possesses decisions and weapons outside the national framework of the State.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Fighting a militia is not fighting the sect to which its members belong, and rejecting weapons outside the State is not rejecting the sect to which their bearers belong.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Hence, the nationalist position cannot be sectarian.<\/strong><\/p>\n

At the core of its vision, the Baath does not view the people of the nation through their sects and sects, but as the sons of one nation, whose rights and duties are equal under a nation-state that protects all. Therefore, defending the State and its sovereignty does not mean defending one sect against another, or one sect against another, but rather defending the right of the entire people to a united, independent State, in which there are no multiple centers of sovereignty and where the tools of power are not distributed among armed groups and organizations.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Even more dangerously, the transformation of militias into representatives of sects or sects contributes to perpetuating what the Arab nation has suffered for a long time: the fragmentation of society into sub-identities, the weakening of national and national belonging, and the transformation of political discord into sectarian conflict.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Here, we should pay close attention to the danger of raising headings such as “eliminating the Houthis,” “striking the Shiites,” or “fighting Hezbollah” if these headings turn from a description of an armed organization or military force to a description of an entire social or sectarian group.<\/strong><\/p>\n

This is precisely the kind of discourse that pushes the conflict from its political and national arena to its sectarian arena, and makes every Shiite a supposed fighter, every Zaydi a supposed Houthi, and every Iraqi, Lebanese, or Yemeni citizen affiliated with an organization or project that has nothing to do with it.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Iraqi Shiite is not a militia, the Lebanese Shiite is not Hezbollah, and the Yemeni Zaydi is not Ansar Allah.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Sunni Arabs are not ISIS, and they are not responsible for every organization that raises a Sunni slogan. Millions of citizens should not be reduced to a political or military organization that claims to represent them.<\/strong><\/p>\n

From a nationalist perspective, falling into this confusion is not just a political mistake; it is a service to those who want to fragment Arab societies and plunge them into internal wars based on sect and sect.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The United States and the Zionist entity have an interest, historically and politically, in striking at the Arab nation, confronting the building of its nation-state, weakening its nation-states, dismantling their centers of power, and keeping the region in a State of conflict and division. Iran, for its part, has used sectarian division and the building of allied armed forces as one of the tools of its regional influence within the Arab World at the expense of the unity of the nation and its national security.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The projects and interests of these parties may conflict in many areas, but this does not negate the fact that weakening the Arab State, fragmenting society, and turning the conflict into a sectarian conflict serve more than one project at the same time.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Therefore, we should not fall into the trap that turns the battle from a battle for sovereignty, independence, and the State into a battle between Sunnis and Shiites, or between Zaydis and the rest of Yemenis, or between the sects of Lebanon.<\/strong><\/p>\n

When we say that what is needed in Yemen is to end the Houthi rebellion, we do not mean to eliminate the Zaydis.<\/strong><\/p>\n

When we say that what is required in Iraq is to bring weapons under the authority of the State, we do not mean to fight the Shiites of Iraq.<\/strong><\/p>\n

When we say that what is required in Lebanon is to limit weapons and military decisions to the State\u00a0 we do not mean to target Lebanese Shiites.<\/strong><\/p>\n

We do not want a Shiite State in Iraq, nor a Sunni State, nor a Zaydi State in Yemen, nor a sectarian State in Lebanon; we want a national State in which citizens are equal, protected by its institutions, and whose sovereign decision is an independent national decision.<\/strong><\/p>\n

This is precisely where the issue lies from an Arab nationalist perspective.<\/strong><\/p>\n

At the current stage, the nation-state is neither the antithesis of the Arab nation nor a substitute for Arab unity; rather, it is the framework that protects society from disintegration, preserves its independence, and creates the objective conditions for the unity project.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The militia, whatever its slogan, cannot be a substitute for the State.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The weapon that protects the homeland must be the weapon of the State; the sovereign decision must be the decision of the State; and the institutions that protect rights must be inclusive national institutions, not partisan, sectarian, or militia institutions.<\/strong><\/p>\n

This does not mean that any ruling authority is absolved of its mistakes or given a blank cheque. The State can make mistakes, governments can deviate, and power can exercise injustice. But the State’s mistakes can be addressed by reforming the State itself, developing its institutions, and fighting for freedom, justice, and popular participation, not by turning the militia into a substitute.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Rejecting the militias does not mean accepting foreign domination, nor does it mean accepting the occupation, aggression, or American, Zionist, Iranian, Turkish, or Ethiopian projects in the region.<\/strong><\/p>\n

On the contrary, an independent national State is the first line of defense against external interference.<\/strong><\/p>\n

A State with multiple armies, authorities, and decision-making centers becomes more permeable, and the weaker the central State, the more regional and international powers can turn its territories into arenas of influence and conflict.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Herein lies the paradox: a militia may raise the slogan of resistance to the United States or the Zionist entity, but its existence as an armed force independent of the State ultimately weakens the nation-state itself, keeping the country an open arena for regional and international conflict.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Hence, the nationalist position does not measure things by slogans alone, but also asks: Who owns the weapons? And who has the decision? And in whose interest is he moving? Does this strengthen or weaken the State and society?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Arab nationalism cannot be based on the fragmentation of Arab societies into sects and sects, nor on subordinating Arab decision-making to regional centers of influence, nor on replacing the nation-state with parallel armed authorities.<\/strong><\/p>\n

We do not accept American and Zionist hegemony, and at the same time we do not accept that the Arab woWorldecomes an area of Iranian, Turkish or any other regional influence.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The party rejects hegemony not by replacing one hegemony with another; it rejects independence not by replacing dependence on the West with dependence on the East; and it rejects the idea that Arab sovereignty is indivisible, according to the party intervening.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Hence, the unity and sovereignty of Yemen and the independence of its national decision, the unity and sovereignty of Iraq, and the independence and national decision of Lebanon are not separate issues from the issue of Arab national security.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The goal is not to “win one party over another,” nor to eradicate the Houthis from Yemeni political and social life, nor to exclude Iraq’s Shiites or Sunnis, Lebanon’s Shiites, or Syria’s Druze.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The goal is for the State\u00a0 to return to its normal function:<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u200eOne State, One People, One Sovereignty, One National Weapon, Independent National Decision, and Institutions That Protect the Rights of All Citizens Without Discrimination.\u200e<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u200eThis is the fundamental difference between the struggle for the State and the war against a component of the people.\u200e<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u200eThe real battle is not with a sect, but with any armed force that uses a sect as a cover for a political or military project outside the State, regardless of the sect and whatever the source of its funding and armaments.\u200e<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u200eThe national State is the true protector of all its citizens, national institutions are the real guarantors of rights, and sovereignty is not protected by militias but by the State.\u200e<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u200eHence, the most accurate description of the war in Yemen is not “the war against the Houthis”, but rather:\u200e<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u200eA war to end the armed rebellion, restore the State, extend its sovereignty over the entire Yemeni territory, and return decision-making and weapons to national institutions.\u200e<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u200eIf a political and military confrontation is to take place, it should remain clear in its objective: not a war against the Zaydis, the Houthis as citizens, or any Yemeni component, but a war against armed insurgency and the duality of power and arms, for the sake of a united, sovereign and independent Yemen.\u200e<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u200eThis, after all, is the position that is in line with the Arab national vision: a homeland that accommodates all its children, a State that protects them all, a sovereignty that is undisputed by no one, and national institutions that are the only protector of the homeland and the only guarantor of rights, on our nation’s path towards unity, liberation and social justice.<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Yemen and the Houthis \u00a0by Dr. Othman Haj Omar – Tunisia Translated from Arabic by Ibrahim Abou Zaid. October 9\/2026 “The War on the Houthis”… a title that distorts the truth and the nature of the conflict. One of the most common phrases used to talk about the war in Yemen is that it is …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":4968,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[51],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4967","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-articles"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sawtoroba.com\/Eng\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4967","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sawtoroba.com\/Eng\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sawtoroba.com\/Eng\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sawtoroba.com\/Eng\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sawtoroba.com\/Eng\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=4967"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sawtoroba.com\/Eng\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4967\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4969,"href":"https:\/\/sawtoroba.com\/Eng\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4967\/revisions\/4969"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sawtoroba.com\/Eng\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/4968"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sawtoroba.com\/Eng\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=4967"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sawtoroba.com\/Eng\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=4967"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sawtoroba.com\/Eng\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=4967"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}