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Negotiations and minefields By Dr. Walid Abdel Hay.

Translated from Arabic by Ibrahim Ebeid

Negotiations and minefields
By Dr. Walid Abdel Hay.

February 28, 2024

Although a formal and announced agreement regarding the results of the negotiations in Paris has not yet been revealed, the leaks reported by the media and the recent statements of the US president are worth stopping at, as they are alarming:
1- I do not rule out – by the theoretical historical experience in international diplomacy at the Arab level – that the negotiations taking place in Paris or Doha are not only the only channels of negotiation, as all Arab-Israeli treaties and agreements were born in places other than those where the midwife is present, from Camp David 1979 to Burhan’s meeting with Netanyahu in Uganda in 2020, passing through Oslo, Wadi Araba and the Abraham Accords… Etc.
2- Biden’s recent statements indicate the following:
A – There is a possibility and not sure” that the agreement on the “ceasefire” within the beginning of next week (approximately Monday), and noted here camouflage in the language, instead of using the expression “truce” that the Palestinian party does not want because it means a shortstop, is the use of the expression ceasefire “sustainable,” any successive truces similar to what happened in the first stage, it indicates that the agreement – according to the theoretical declaration – is on a ceasefire, when the truth is Agreement on a truce said to last 40 days, not a ceasefire (Truce not Ceasefire), and in international jurisprudence does not mean a ceasefire in common sense.
B – The context of the negotiation makes the release of hostages is the priority and not the Israeli withdrawal or aid at the level demanded by the United Nations, the negotiation does not go in parallel between the topics, but by making everything Israel wants above others, and it is certain that the release of hostages gradually is the removal of the central concern of Netanyahu, and then his hand becomes free to do anything without deterrence from any party and without worries from the families of the hostages, and this is confirmed by what was stated in Biden’s meeting with NBC, where he said, “There is an agreement between the Israelis not to carry out any activities during the Ramadan in order to give ourselves time to get the hostages out,” and I think that checking Biden’s phrases indicates two things, which are the priority of returning the hostages on the one hand, but the resumption of fighting after returning them on the other hand, which requires attention from the side of the resistance, and two interrelated ends must not be separated: The end of the issue of Israeli hostages with the end of the Israeli military presence in the Gaza Strip.
C- Biden said that Israel has pledged not to conduct “military activities” during Ramadan, but what is Israel’s definition of military activity? So, is the entry of more Israeli troops into the Strip considered military activity or not? Is the continued search for resistance elements, tunnels, weapons depots, recruitment of operatives, or preventing the repair of some facilities by force a military act? The fact that Israeli forces remain in Gaza is in itself a military act.
If the resistance adopts the slogan of unity of squares, why does the truce not include stopping the incursions into cities, camps, and countryside in the West Bank? What about the situation at Al-Aqsa and its military encirclement, especially during Ramadan (the month of the proposed truce)? Not to mention the arrests that will be used to barter with Israeli hostages.
D- Biden says that “Israel committed to enabling the Palestinians to evacuate from Rafah before intensifying its campaign there to destroy Hamas,” which clearly means that Biden agrees to occupy Rafah and resume military action in Rafah (although he previously warned about it now he has folded these warnings). The disagreement between him and Netanyahu is that he wants to mitigate the repercussions of killing civilians on Israel’s image. At the same time, Netanyahu does not see it as that serious, which means that Biden is more Netanyahu’s concerned about Israel’s image; he wants to destroy Rafah without harming Israel’s image through its own genocide.
3- There have been reports from international media agencies that an agreement is about to expire stipulates:
A- The exchange of hostages and detainees with an Israeli reality for every 10 Palestinian detainees; if this is true, it means the release of about 130 Israelis for 1300 Palestinians, which represents the release of 100% Israeli hostages, in exchange for the release of about 15-16% of the Palestinian detainees. This makes the subject of “whitewashing prisons” ridiculous… Therefore, the exchange should be 10%, 20%, or 100% of them versus 10%, 20%, or 100% of the Palestinians, and some may see this as an exaggeration, and here we ask: Didn’t they release 1027 in exchange for Shalit? The resistance now has about 130 Shalit. So why does the equation change? Shalit can be considered a historical precedent that can be relied upon and applied again. Instead, the bodies of their dead are included in the account.
B – Entering 500 trucks of aid, it is necessary to be careful; trucks are a loose expression; there is a truck that can accommodate ten tons and others for two tons … Therefore, it is necessary to determine the quantities of aid, not the number of its tankers, (in the Oslo annexes, the Jews specified the types of imports to the West Bank and Gaza to the extent of determining the kind of chickpeas and lentils that enter and those that do not). Therefore, the equation must be based on estimates by international organizations of the individual’s need for calories per day and the quantities of consumption of water, electricity, and gas per capita in a normal situation. Then this aid is entered based on daily need, and let the aid be every week in quantities sufficient for a week, and so on…
C- There have been reports that residents of northern Gaza will be allowed to return with the condition that there should be no men over 18 years old among them (which means that Israel fears that returning to them means the possibility of joining the ranks of the resistance), but how will the wife and her children return and leave her husband, who will help her and support her children? Therefore, the return should be based on families, and the number should be agreed upon according to the reality of the negotiations, with the condition that Eid al-Fitr completes the return process for the northern residents.
It was said that Israel would commit not to conduct air activities (warplanes or drones) for 8 hours every day (i.e., it is entitled to 16 hours) if we know that the average speed of the drones ranges from 450 to 500 kilometers per hour. We understand that the area of the entire Gaza Strip is 365 square kilometers and that its lengths (from north to south and east to west) do not exceed, in the most extreme cases, 20 kilometers. In other words, the 16 hours allowed for Israeli air to move over Gaza is enough to move from Moscow to the Russian city of Khabarovsk, which is 6,147 kilometers away, for about one and a half times, or to survey the Strip about 12 times a day.
Finally, the negotiating framework suggests:
(a) There is an Israeli-American-Arab agreement to get rid of the Palestinian resistance in the Gaza Strip.
B- Preparing for a Palestinian government (and Shtayyeh’s resignation is a prelude to that) that would agree to “international legitimacy” and return to Oslo in its new form, which is the Saudi Arabian initiative, which will give Israel a way out of the maneuver regarding the two-state solution, which will return us to a new chapter in the famous story of the oil jug.
C- Israel realizes through what has happened during the past five months approximately that the Arab countries, including the Security Coordination Authority, will not cut their relations with Israel even if Israel occupies the entire Gaza Strip, emigrates it, settles the whole West Bank and destroys Al-Aqsa, a strategic assessment replete with the reports of critical Israeli studies centers, and it realizes that the Arab countries cut their relations with each other for the most trivial reasons, but the American penetration into Arab institutions stifles any position against Israel.
So far, despite the efforts of the axis of resistance to influence the previous track, adherence to the current borders of the theater of battles will make Israel more confident in its ability to control any repercussions on the prevailing course so far.
C- It is necessary for the resistance to demand an international committee that includes several countries that send observers to ensure implementation, and the observer countries include Russia, China, South Africa, and Brazil. Israel proposes if it agrees.
I have never been afraid of Arab military battles, and Gaza demonstrates this, but I am terrified of their political battles.

Note: Translated from Arabic by Ibrahim Ebeid.

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