Sudanese Communist Party. The Horizon of Isolation and the Consequences of Radicalization ((A Reading in the Dialectic of Strategy and Tactics)) By Mohamed Diaa El-Din.
Translated from Arabic by Ibrahim Ebeid. March 22/2026
Sudanese Communist Party.
The Horizon of Isolation and the Consequences of Radicalization
((A Reading in the Dialectic of Strategy and Tactics))
By Mohamed Diaa El-Din.
Translated from Arabic by Ibrahim Ebeid. March 22/2026
The Sudanese revolutionary forces follow the positions of the Communist Party, not from a position of adversity, as the Sudanese Communist Party, with its long experience, has remained one of the pillars of the mass movement. However, what raises questions today is the contradiction between his political discourse, which radically turned into an ideological bias that isolated the Party from the complex movement of reality, and the tendency of (some) of its cadres, especially in the public sphere, to take a widening distance from the rest of the revolutionary forces, which raises a legitimate question about the cost of this positioning on the entire revolutionary action.
I am writing these lines from the site of the joint experience of struggle with an estimated number of communist colleagues, and from the memory of the “ghost houses” and the detention centers that brought us together in the face of tyranny, in order not to let go of the compass of collective action. From this particular website, I deliberately borrow some of the reading tools that the Communists themselves have long used to put this moment before the mirror of their experience and theory, especially regarding the relationship between tactics and strategy, the boundaries of articulation, and the limits of alliance and coordination.
If the Communist Party bases its analysis on the materialistic dialectical method as a tool for understanding the reality of its movement and its contradictions. The fear today is that it will slide from a strategic horizon to an isolationist tactic that lacks revolutionary flexibility and a paradox of reality, and to a closed position that leads to political isolation in practice. This isolation, whatever its motives and justifications, weakens the ability to influence. Radical change is not an act isolated from the interaction of subjective factors (the strength of the Party and its organization) with objective factors (the readiness of the masses and the nature of the balance of power).
Ignoring these realities leads to retreating under the slogans of revolutionary purity, which lacks the awareness of the “historical bloc” formulated by the Communist Party in the document “The Way to Achieve the National Democratic Revolution”. And here an important dialectical question arises. Can radicalism retain its effectiveness if it is separated from the conditions for building a broad mass capable of carrying the project of radical change?
The Party’s own experiences have proved that frontal action is the application of a law (the accumulation of quantitative changes that lead to a qualitative transformation).
Therefore, political alliances and coordination were not a tactical option so much as a “dialectical necessity” to bring together the forces with an interest in change despite their differences, imposed by the nature of their development and the conflict in Sudan.
Hence, the call today is not to dilute positions or compromise on principles, but rather to the importance of practical coordination between the forces of the Revolution on urgent tasks until the completion of the conditions for building the broad front for democracy and change, as the instrument of the inclusive Revolution that the Sudanese people aspire to to form a way out of the crisis of national development. If joint action between the forces of the Revolution is impossible, coordination on critical issues is an inevitable necessity. If this is also possible, each side should retain its position in the arena, without the forces of apostasy descending into a dispute among the forces of the Revolution itself, thus squandering their energies and weakening their front against their opponents. Secondary contradictions, in themselves, do not constitute a crisis unless they become a rupture that drains everyone and objectively serves the forces of the counter-revolution. Hence, coordination is necessary to ensure that the mass movement is not disrupted by the military incursion and remnants.
In this context, the debate on the tools of the Revolution, especially the Committee for the Dismantling of the Empowerment of the June 30, 1989, Regime, is of particular importance. Instead of turning disagreement about it into a cause of rupture, it can be a gateway to its development and rectification in its second birth, based on the verification of the possibility of the conditions of the criticism itself, rather than the projection of the “radical criticism” that takes things from their roots.
What is required is to preserve the role of the committee as a revolutionary tool born in the context of a complex conflict as one of the mechanisms for dismantling the structure of the old regime, while at the same time preventing any objective intersections about the restoration of its role with the theses of the counter-revolutionary forces.
On the other hand, the absence of a clear official position from the leadership of the Communist Party until the writing of this article about the return of the Committee for the Dismantling of Empowerment is, in my estimation, what has opened the way for the jurisprudence of some cadres to adopt different positions that may be counted on the Party, which raises the need to adjust the public discourse in a way that reflects the institutional position, especially in light of the conditions of war that have resulted (to varying degrees) in all parties without exception for reasons that we are not currently dealing with, a state of laxity of some members in political commitment and discipline.
The current moment and the war are approaching their fourth year, with profound humanitarian and political repercussions that force a reordering of priorities because “unity of action does not match visions.” Adhering to national constants, ending the war, addressing its effects, and restoring the civil democratic path are tasks that cannot be delayed or divided. Here, too, an objective question arises. Which is more serviceable for these tasks, spacing or the minimum possible format?
This is not an argument against the Communist Party and its political line, but rather an appeal to it, from a position of struggle and a common national concern, to invoke the best of its critical traditions and to view its current reality through the eyes of its long experience. The rigidity of the theory is not measured by the extent of distancing itself from other forces under the pretext of Revolution and revolutionary purity, but by the ability to penetrate reality and manage its contradictions in favor of the democratic alternative.
The real root, in my humble estimation, is not in being in the joints with everyone, but in the ability to lead change by engaging with people’s issues and building the widest possible base around them. That is the challenge, and the horizon that deserves to be met and worked towards together.
