An Arab attempt to restore the nation’s right to make history By Tarek Abd El – Latif Abu Akrema –
By Tarek Abd El - Latif Abu Akrema -Translated from Arabic by Ibrahim Ebeid. July 17- 2026
An Arab attempt to restore the nation’s right to make history
By Tarek Abd El – Latif Abu Akrema –
Translated from Arabic by Ibrahim Ebeid. July 17- 2026
The great revolutions are not those that change governments, but those that change nations’ perceptions and reshape their relationship to history. Some events end at the moment, and others become long-term questions. This is the kind of revolution of July 17-30, 1968, which was not just a transfer of power, but an Arab attempt to redefine the state, the human being, and the role of the nation in making history.
The July Revolution was not just a transfer of power, but a philosophical attempt to answer a question that has been haunting Arab nationalist thought since the Arab nation entered the stage of successive civilizational breakdowns, and the fall of Baghdad in 1258 was one of its most prominent turning points.
In the Ba’athist sense, the July Revolution was not a closed Iraqi national project but rather saw Iraq as part of a broader Arab renaissance, based on the belief that the power of each country should be transformed into an added force for the entire Arab nation. Therefore, the success of the nation-state was not opposed to the idea of Arab unity, but was seen as one of its precursors, because a strong nation is not built from weak countries, but from capable national states that are economically, culturally, and politically integrated with each other.
The experience of the July Revolution clearly implemented the intellectual vision put forward by Professor Michel Aflaq regarding the Arab nation as a civilizational message, a vision reflected in the political discourse and development programs adopted by the national governments of Iraq.
Arab nationalist thought has realized that the most dangerous form of colonialism is not the occupation of the land, and one of the most dangerous forms of hegemony can be described as the occupation of time, i.e., depriving the Arab nation of its ability to shape its future. The defeated nation not only loses its wealth but also its ability to plan for the future, becoming a society that consumes what the other produces, thinks about what the other produces, and dreams of what the other allows. Hence, the philosophy of the July Revolution. The goal was not only to manage Iraq, but also to return it to the position of an actor in Arab history, not a recipient of others’ results. The martyred leader Saddam Hussein summed up this nationalist dimension when he stressed in one of the words of the July Revolution that Iraq’s strength is not only for Iraq, but for the entire Arab nation, indicating that the project was not a closed regional project, but part of a broader national vision.
In the Ba’athist concept, Iraq was not a self-contained project, but rather an advanced base in a broader Arab project. Development in Iraq was therefore understood as an added force of the Arab nation, rather than an isolated country achievement. In this context, any national progress should open the way to unity, not close it.
That is why the founding leader, Michel Aflaq, saw the revolution not as a mere transfer of power, but as a change in the human being first, because the new man is the one who creates the new state. Education was not a service, but an industry of reason. Oil was seen not only as a financial resource, but also as a tool for building economic independence and financing a national development project. Therefore, the talk about oil has always been linked to human development, in line with what the martyred leader Saddam Hussein repeatedly asserted, that “the real wealth is man”, because natural resources lose their value if they are not transformed into knowledge and production. The army was not only a fighting institution but also a school for building national will. Culture was not understood as an elitist activity, but as one of the pillars of civilizational security, and an intrinsic part of national security. This is where the idea that characterized the Ba’athist experience in Iraq emerged, that development is not an increase in income, but an increase in the value of the human being.
There is a difference between a country that owns oil and one that produces oil for the future. This is the difference that the July Revolution tried to make. Oil has gone from being a resource controlled by foreign companies to a base for financing a broad national project that includes industry, agriculture, education, health, infrastructure, and scientific research.
It was perhaps one of the most prominent modern Arab attempts to turn oil wealth into a national development project, as the Arab man felt that his wealth could be turned into a university, a laboratory, a factory, a dam, a road, rather than bank accounts outside the borders. The conflict with Iraq was therefore not a struggle over oil alone, but rather the model it presented.
Nations are not besieged because they are poor. You are trapped when you become capable of being an example. Poverty does not scare the great powers, but independent success frightens them. That is why Iraq was targeted not only because it had resources, but because it tried to prove that political will could transform resources into an Arab renaissance project. The most dangerous thing about a successful experiment is that it convinces others that success is possible.
But great historical experiments are tested not only in the moment of their ascension, but also in the way they are targeted. When Iraq was occupied in 2003, the target was not just a political system or a ruling authority, but the national state with all its accumulated scientific, industrial, military, and administrative institutions and capabilities. The state, which took decades to build, was dismantled in a few months, and Iraq has entered a new phase characterized by the restructuring of its political, economic, and social structure according to different equations. Hence, the fall of the state was not a purely Iraqi event, but rather a profound turning point in the entire Arab system, because the collapse of one of the largest Arab countries in terms of capabilities redrew the balance of power in the region and opened the door to transformations whose effects continue to this day.
The occupation can defeat an army, dismantle institutions, and change the maps of power, but it cannot eliminate the nation’s need for a renaissance project. Historical need is not abolished by force, but is renewed as its causes increase. Therefore, the fall of the nation-state in Iraq was not the end of the questions posed by the July Revolution, but the beginning of a new phase of the search for it. The continuation of nationalist thought in the production of its conferences, dialogues, and revisions, the latest of which is the 13th National Congress in 2026, is an expression that great ideas may go through periods of decline. Still, they do not leave history as long as the conditions they created remain in place.
Today, more than half a century later, the question may no longer be: What did the July Revolution do? Rather, the most important question has become: Why is the July Revolution still present in Arab memory? The answer is that events die, but ideas don’t. Many governments have come to an end, many regimes have fallen, but the idea of a capable, independent, productive Arab state is still looking for a new opportunity.
But the real value of historical experience lies not in its literal repetition, but in its ability to inspire new generations. What is required is not for the Arab countries to reproduce the experience of the July Revolution, as it happened more than half a century ago, because each stage has its own conditions and tools, but rather to restore the idea on which it was based, in building a strong national state, a productive economy, an educated human being, independent sovereignty, and development that makes wealth in the service of society rather than in the service of dependency. The future is not built by reproducing the past, but by reading its spirit and transforming its principles into policies that suit the challenges of the 21st century, such as the knowledge economy, artificial intelligence, food security, and technological independence. Thus, the experience is transformed from a historical event into a source of civilizational inspiration, not just a political memory.
Therefore, the July Revolution does not live in the past so much as in the questions the Arab nation has yet to answer. How do we build a strong state without losing freedom? How do we turn wealth into development? How do we create an independent economy? How do we restore science to its status? How do we make unity a practical project rather than an emotional slogan? These questions are the real legacy of July.
Perhaps the greatest irony is that many Arab countries are still confronted, decades later, with the same questions the July Revolution sought to answer: How to build a productive state? And how does oil become an industry? How does the university become a center for development? How does politics turn into a project for building people rather than for managing crises? Therefore, the experience of the July Revolution does not seem to be a thing of the past, as much as it seems to be a question that has not lost its relevance.
The forgotten revolutions are those that have only changed the rulers. The revolutions that remain are the ones that have changed the way people think. This vision was not merely a matter of political theory. Still, it was translated into public policies that were reflected in the expansion of free education, literacy campaigns, the development of health care, industrialization, the expansion of irrigation projects, the construction of universities, and scientific research centers, and this was linked to a policy that aimed to transform oil rents into long-term investment in people and institutions, rather than short-term consumer spending. These steps made Iraq during the 1970s and 1980s one of the most advanced Arab countries in terms of education, health, and infrastructure, before wars and international sanctions later weakened many of these gains.
This was reflected in higher education rates, lower illiteracy, expanded health-care services, and improved infrastructure, according to UNESCO and UNDP reports at the time. However, the real value of these achievements lies not only in their numbers, but also in the possibility they reveal of transforming resources into a civilizational project when there is political will.
Perhaps the greatest message of the 17th-30th anniversary of July 17 is that the Renaissance is not a one-time event, but a state of consciousness that is renewed whenever the nation dares to think for itself. Therefore, the July Revolution will remain a milestone in modern Arab history, because it not only ran the state, but also tried to put forward a civilizational project that redefined the meaning of the state, the meaning of development, the meaning of independence, and the meaning of the Arab nation being the decision-maker and not the subject of the decisions of others. History, after all, holds not only the names of those who ruled, but also the names of those who tried to change the course of time. The July Revolution was, first of all, a bold Arab attempt to write the time with the will of the Arab nation, not with the will of others.
Perhaps this is why the July Revolution remains present in Arab memory: it sought to translate a deep faith expressed by Professor Michel Aflaq, who placed the value of the nation in what it believes, not in what it has. Wealth can be plundered, the state can be occupied, and the idea that settles in the conscience of the Arab nation can still be reborn. Perhaps that is why the July Revolution remained present in Arab memory: it was not just a memory of a revolution, but an open question about the Arab nation’s ability to rise again. Experiments may end, states may fall, and ideas that express a deep historical need do not die, but wait for a new generation to rediscover them and give them the tools of their time. It realizes its free self and restores to the Arab nation its missionary role in civilizational and humanitarian contribution.
