‎Is Ethiopia looking for a port or influence in the Red Sea?‎ By Nimer Zakaria Translated to Arabic by Ibrahim Ebeid.

‎Is Ethiopia looking for a port or influence in the Red Sea?‎

By Nimer Zakaria

Translated to Arabic by Ibrahim Ebeid.

‎Ethiopia has been a landlocked country since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, and its foreign trade is heavily dependent on neighboring ports, especially Djibouti. This situation is a strategic problem for a country with a population of more than 100 million, and that wants to maintain broad economic growth and an influential political presence in East Africa. Addis Ababa has been looking for alternatives for years to reduce its dependence on a single port and gain greater control over its foreign trade routes.‎

‎The problem is not Ethiopia’s right to seek solutions to a real geographical and economic problem. The problem is the way in which this right is being presented and the limits to which the Ethiopian project can reach. Ethiopia is not only talking about using a port to serve its trade, but also about access to the sea as part of its national security and territorial standing. When an economic issue moves to the level of national security, it becomes linked to the military, foreign policy, and regional alliances, not only to ports and trade. Ethiopia can negotiate port leases, invest in ports, build logistics zones, finance roads and railways, and conclude long-term agreements with coastal states. All of this can be done within the rules of international law and respect for the sovereignty of states. Turning the need for the sea into a permanent demand for a political or military presence on the coast is a very different path.‎

‎Somaliland agreement exposed the problem. The agreement signed by Ethiopia with Somaliland in January 2024 revealed the scale of the crisis. The agreement gave Addis Ababa access to the Red Sea coast through an area controlled by Somaliland, in exchange for economic and political arrangements, it was announced at the time.The Somali government rejected the agreement, deeming it a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, as Mogadishu considers Somaliland part of the Somali state.The problem here is not about the port alone.If a strong regional state can conclude a direct agreement with an entity that does not enjoy international recognition as an independent state, bypassing the central government of the state that considers the region part of its territory, the agreement will be. The issue opens the door to similar crises in Africa. The Horn of Africa is full of disputes over borders, identity and sovereignty. The Turkish intervention and the negotiations that led to the Ankara Declaration between Ethiopia and Somalia have eased the crisis. Still, they have not eliminated the main reason Addis Ababa sought a seaport.Ethiopia’s need for the sea still exists.Assab reopens the file. On the other hand, after the Somaliland crisis, all eyes have turned to Eritrea and the port of Assab.Assab is not just a trade point on the coast. Its location makes it part of the military and strategic calculations in the Red Sea, and the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea carries a heavy history of war and border conflict. Any attempt to establish a long-term Ethiopian presence in Assab will read in Asmara as a matter of national security, not just an economic agreement. This is where the main problem in the Ethiopian project arises.‎

‎A country that wants a sea port needs stable relations with coastal states. But Ethiopia is moving within a region already plagued by mistrust among its governments. Therefore, any uncalculated step may prompt the surrounding countries to coordinate their positions against Addis Ababa.The Red Sea is not an Ethiopian space.The idea that Ethiopia’s population and economic size make access to a seaport a necessity cannot be ignored.This idea is understood from the perspective of Ethiopian interests, but it is not enough to create a political right.The Red Sea borders countries that have direct sovereignty over its coasts, each with its own security and economic interests. Eritrea, Egypt, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Djibouti, and Somalia are not secondary parties to this equation. Ethiopia can be a player in the Red Sea economy, but it cannot treat the Red Sea as a natural arena for expanding its political and military influence. The difference between participating in the sea economy and having strategic influence on the coast should remain clear.‎

‎Egypt enters Ethiopian accounts; Cairo views Ethiopia’s expansion in the Red Sea through a broader security lens.The dispute over the Renaissance Dam has made the relationship between Egypt and Ethiopia one of the most sensitive in the region. Therefore, the emergence of an Ethiopian force with a large land presence and then its acquisition of a naval presence will change Egypt’s calculus in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.For Egypt, the issue is not just a port.A permanent Ethiopian presence at sea could add a new dimension to the regional balance of power, especially if it is linked to military cooperation, naval bases, or long-term security agreements.This explains part of Cairo’s interest in strengthening its relations with the countries of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.Djibouti also has something to lose. The one that receives the least attention in this debate is Djibouti.Djibouti’s economy has benefited greatly from Ethiopia’s dependence on its ports. Millions of tons of Ethiopian goods pass through Djiboutian territory and ports, making the economic relationship between the two countries important to both parties.‎

‎Despite its crisis, Sudan is also part of this equation by virtue of its location on the Red Sea. The Sudanese war weakened Khartoum’s ability to manage its external and maritime files normally, but it did not eliminate the importance of Sudan’s location. The Port of Port Sudan and Sudanese territorial waters are part of the region’s maritime balance.Any Ethiopian expansion in the Red Sea will affect Sudanese calculations, especially since relations between the two countries are marked by contentious issues over borders, water, and the Renaissance Dam.The Sudanese crisis gives other regional powers more room to maneuver, making the Red Sea more vulnerable to competition from countries seeking new locations in the region.The problem is not Ethiopia’s access to the sea. Ethiopia can build economic partnerships with Djibouti, Somalia, and Eritrea when political conditions allow, and it can invest in ports and free zones, finance infrastructure, and sign long-term trade contracts. Its size does not give it an additional right to the sovereignty of others.‎

‎Ethiopia is a large and influential country in Africa, and it has the right to seek its interests. The Red Sea does not need a new power vying for influence.It needs a regional system that protects trade, guarantees freedom of navigation, and prevents ports from being turned into instruments of political and military conflict.Ethiopia needs the sea for obvious economic reasons. Still, how it gets there will determine whether this project becomes an opportunity for regional cooperation or a new cause of conflict in the Horn of Africa. The question for Addis Ababa is not whether it needs the sea. The question is: can it get a seaport without turning its economic needs into a project that threatens the region’s balance?‎