‎WILL EGYPT RETURN TO YEMEN? Walid Abd El Hai‎ Translated from Arabic by Ibrahim Ebeid

‎WILL EGYPT RETURN TO YEMEN?

Walid Abd El Hai‎

Translated from Arabic by Ibrahim Ebeid

‎The current confrontation in the Red Sea between the government of Aden and its successor, Saudi Arabia, and the government of Sana’a has prompted several initial scenarios related to Egypt, whose income from the revenues of the Suez Canal constitutes the fourth source of the Egyptian economy after the remittances of workers abroad, non-oil exports, and tourism. What are the costs for it, such as tourism or commodity exports? etc.), which makes its weight in the Egyptian balance of payments greater.‎

‎This means that Egypt faces several possibilities (with the possibility of a crisis developing):‎

‎First: It is clear that Ansar Allah’s statement after their control of the maritime geography of the Red Sea focused on an important point, which is that the control “will not affect international maritime navigation except for Saudi Arabia”, and in my estimation, the first meaning in this is Egypt, without denying that other exporting and importing countries are concerned to one degree or another, but Egypt is the desired target before others, because inflicting damage on this very important facility for the Egyptian balance of payments will push Egypt towards several possibilities, one of which is intervention Direct military, which is what Ansar Allah wants.‎

‎Ansar Allah’s reassurance in its statement has greatly reduced pressure on Egypt to intervene. Still, it does not completely eliminate the risk that the confrontation could escalate in a way that paralyzes the Suez Canal regardless of the decision in Sana’a, thereby reopening the possibility of intervention.‎

‎Second: There is a possibility that Saudi Arabia will work to bring in other powers by means of financial temptation, sectarian excavation, or by seeking the help of other forces (Arab or non-Arab), which pushes the increase of players in the battle for control of the sea, which ends up paralyzing the Suez Canal, which puts Egypt in front of two tracks: engaging in the confrontation against Ansar Allah (a path in which Westerners may intervene, directly or indirectly, including Israel), which constitutes pressure on Egypt to intervene. Rather, it serves as a cover for intervention in front of Egyptian society, whose memory of Yemen is a bitter one. Trump’s reluctance to respond to the “appeal” may hide his desire to bear the burden of confrontation with Ansar Allah by other Arab or non-Arab powers, as Trump has something more dangerous at the moment, and the midterm congressional elections mean more to him than “the happiness of Yemen.”‎

‎Third: It is not unlikely that Egypt will find itself facing two opposing temptations: a large Saudi financial temptation that is countered by an Emirati temptation driven by the desire to reduce Saudi influence after uprooting the Emirati influence from Yemen with Saudi support, and if Egypt does not respond to the temptations of intervention, the Gulf behavior may move towards its instincts by putting pressure on Egyptian workers in the Gulf, which represents approximately $11 billion (which is equal to 25% of the total remittances of Egyptian workers abroad, whose remittances are the source If we assume that Saudi Arabia has started to put pressure on this facility, even if gradually, it is difficult for Egypt to adapt to it, if Egypt responds to the Saudi pressure, it should think about how to justify the matter to the UAE, from which the Egyptians transfer about $8 billion annually. Following the Al-Hikma deal with Egypt, the UAE became one of Egypt’s largest investors, with an investment of close to $24 billion, bringing the total to $35 billion. At the same time, the Ras Al-Hikma project remains a priority.‎

‎Fourth: In light of these conflicting dichotomies, Egypt “may” find that the solution is:‎

‎a. Attempting to seek diplomatic solutions to solve the problem as soon as possible, through compromise between the Saudi and Yemeni parties and in coordination with the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, despite the holes in this perception.‎

‎b) Egypt’s attempt to “intervene behind a veil” in the battle through military advisers, cooperation with Israel and the affected international powers, or by attempting to intervene in passing, provide information, or intelligence cooperation with Saudi Arabia. ‎

‎Egypt can use a maritime incident to respond quickly and effectively to Ansar Allah in a deterrent manner without fully engaging in confrontation, but this should serve as a “signal to Saudi Arabia” not to take undesirable measures against Egypt.‎

‎Indirect Effects:‎

‎The crisis in the Red Sea (despite the statement from Ansar Allah) may raise the risk index for commercial ships, which puts them in front of three options: either to take the risk and cross the Red Sea (despite the possibility of sudden battles or attacks) or to turn towards the Cape of Good Hope, which will cause Egypt to lose a certain amount of income in parallel with the ships that are likely to turn towards the Cape of Good Hope, or some companies or international bodies (especially Europe) will stop in light of its crisis with Russia in light of its crisis with Russia. Ukraine) to send its ships and goods, or some of them, and this is also a loss to Egypt, even if relatively.‎

‎Egypt may move diplomatically through mediation, the Arab League, participation in an emergency meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council, or even by appealing to international powers or regional organizations to speed up the confrontation.‎

‎We have already said that Egyptian security has suffered strategic damage due to a narrow official understanding of security, as Egypt is surrounded by fire around it (Libya is torn and rivaled in the west, Sudan is torn and rivaled in the south, the Red Sea is on fire in the west, and the Gaza Strip in the north does not need to be described), not to mention a regional environment that is inflamed and boiling in the cauldron of various international powers, which means that Egypt is in the heart of the hearth. Naturally, its sparks will touch it.‎

‎ Egypt’s neglect of the “genius of the place,” as described by Egyptian strategic thinker Gamal Hamdan, will only bear fruit if nurtured by the “genius of leadership” and an undelusional, futuristic outlook shaped by Egyptian minds aware of the world’s complexities. Egypt’s retreat from the region’s problems is “escape, not wisdom,” even if we think well. Maybe‎