Hezbollah between the Lebanese decision and the Iranian tutelage: the dilemma of the state within the state on /28/06 2026 By Hassan Khalil Gharib’
Hezbollah between the Lebanese decision and the Iranian tutelage: the dilemma of the state within the state on /28/06 2026
By Hassan Khalil Gharib’
Translated from Arabic by Ibrahim Ebeid.
Since Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, through Security Council Resolution 1701 in 2006, to the last ceasefire agreement in November 2024, the Lebanese state has remained the official entity addressing the implementation of international obligations. However, the reality on the ground reveals that the actual military party in the confrontation is Hezbollah, which deals with these decisions with a double logic: to shirk official responsibility and to reserve the right to open the war whenever it wants. This behavior cannot be isolated from direct or indirect Iranian intervention, which makes the party a regional tool that transcends the boundaries of the Lebanese national decision.
Hezbollah’s behavior in this context can be described as a behavior of double standards or the behavior of a permanent obstructionist, because it treats international resolutions as if they are directed only at the Lebanese state. At the same time, it is the actual military party in the confrontation.
First: Characteristics of this behavior: It refuses to recognize that it is directly concerned with international resolutions and leaves the Lebanese state to face its obligations alone. He insists that he remains the final sayer in opening the confrontation with Israel, regardless of the official position of the state. This behavior undermines the legitimacy of the Lebanese State in the eyes of the international community, as it appears unable to control its territory or fulfill its obligations. Every time a solution or settlement is proposed, the party opens a new round of confrontation, leaving Lebanon in a state of perpetual conflict.
This behavior can be described as “systematic sabotage behavior” because it leaves the state helpless and reproduces chaos as it approaches a solution. It denies responsibility for international obligations while imposing its military and political dominance on national decision-making. It acts as an independent entity that owns the decision of war and peace, while the formal State is left to the international community.
Hezbollah’s behavior in dealing with international resolutions to resolve the conflict with Israel is obstructive and repudiating, aimed at keeping Lebanon in a state of perpetual conflict, and making the state look like a façade while the real decision is in its hands.
Hezbollah is like a player who rejects the group’s rules; whenever a team comes together on a common law, it sets its own rules. This behavior reflects an insistence on hegemony and a refusal to integrate into the national system. It puts the state in the position of a formal façade, while the real decision remains in its hands. The result is that Lebanon is in a constant state of conflict because one player refuses to abide by the rules of the national game and insists on breaking them.
Second: Hezbollah between the State and the International Decision: The Dilemma of Responsibility and Disavowal
Since Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, through Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), and up to the last ceasefire agreement on November 27, 2024, the Lebanese state has been the official entity to address the implementation of international obligations. However, the reality on the ground reveals that the actual military party in the confrontation is Hezbollah, which deals with these decisions with a double logic: to shirk official responsibility and to reserve the right to open the war whenever it wants.
- International resolutions and the responsibility of the
Lebanese state – Resolution 425 (1978): Demanded that Israel withdraw immediately and unconditionally from Lebanon, and affirmed the extension of the authority of the Lebanese State over its entire territory.
Resolution 1701 (2006) explicitly stated the Government of Lebanon’s responsibility to prevent the presence of any weapons outside the framework of the State and called for the disarmament of militias.
The Ceasefire Agreement (2024) reaffirmed the Lebanese state’s responsibility for seizing arms south of the Litani and deployed the Lebanese army with international support.
These legal provisions place the Lebanese state in a position of direct responsibility, but in reality, they aim to control Hezbollah’s behavior as the de facto armed party.
- Hezbollah’s behavior: It constantly shirked its responsibility and refused to admit that it was concerned with decisions, and insists that the state alone is responsible for implementation. His monopoly on the decision of war and peace was opening new rounds of confrontation with Israel, even after the issuance of international resolutions on a ceasefire. The proof was in the rejection of the recent agreement (between Lebanon and Israel) on June 26, 2026, which called for an end to the war, stressing that it is not bound by what Washington or the international community decides.
Hezbollah’s repeated rejection of international resolutions and statements by major powers, including the recent U.S. statement, reflects a structural crisis in Lebanon: an official state that bears legal responsibility, and an armed party imposing a reality on the ground that contradicts those commitments. This behavior puts Lebanon in a position of helplessness before the international community. It makes any attempt to stop the war or stabilize the situation hostage to the decision of Hezbollah, not the decision of the state.
3- Hezbollah between the State and the International Resolution: The Dilemma of Responsibility and Disavowal: Since Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, through Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), and the recent ceasefire agreement on November 27, 2024, and up to the June 2026 agreement, the Lebanese state has been the official entity to implement international obligations. However, the reality on the ground reveals that the actual military party in the confrontation is Hezbollah, which deals with these decisions with a double logic: to shirk official responsibility and to reserve the right to open the war whenever it wants.
Third: Hezbollah and the decision to go to war: Between Beirut and Tehran
Since its establishment in the 1980s, Hezbollah has not hidden its ideological and political connection to the velayat-e faqih in Iran. Over time, this association evolved into a strategic dependency, leading the party to act on major issues in line with Tehran’s calculations rather than the interests of the Lebanese state. With every international resolution or external statement calling for an end to the war with Israel, Iranian interference is evident, either directly or through the party’s refusal to abide by the Lebanese state’s decision.
Evidence of Iranian interference:
In the 1985 “Open Letter”, the party explicitly declared its commitment to velayat-e faqih, which means that its strategic decisions are linked to the Iranian reference.
Resolution 1701 (2006) held the Lebanese State responsible for disarming the militias and extending its authority south of the Litani. But in practice, it has shown that the party actually concerned is Hezbollah, which has refused to fully abide by the resolution, relying on Iranian political and military support.
- Also, the party’s participation in the Syrian war in 2011 came in direct response to an Iranian strategic decision, not an internal Lebanese interest. In addition, his coordination with the Palestinian factions is carried out through Iranian channels.
When Washington called for an end to the war with Israel on June 26, 2026, the party rejected the content of the statement, stressing that it is not bound by the decisions of the United States or the international community, in line with Iran’s position rejecting any settlement that does not take into account its regional interests.
Hizbullah’s behavior can therefore be described as a direct extension of the Iranian decision. It disavows the Lebanese state’s responsibility to the international community, yet in practice, it abides by the orders of the supreme leader. This behavior makes Lebanon an arena of Iranian influence, turning international resolutions into formal texts that cannot be implemented. This is a reflection of Iran’s blatant interference in the Lebanese decision. In this sense, the party’s behavior can only be understood within the context of a “state within a state,” where the real decision is made in Tehran, while Beirut is left to face the international community with its face exposed.
Conclusion
Hezbollah’s repeated rejection of international resolutions and American statements, including the recent statement to stop the war, is not just an internal position but a reflection of blatant Iranian interference in the Lebanese decision. The party disavows the state’s responsibility to the international community, but in practice adheres to the orders of the Supreme Leader in Tehran, turning Lebanon into an Iranian arena of influence and leaving the state helpless. Thus, Lebanon remains hostage to the “state within the state” equation, where the real thing is being taken outside Beirut. At the same time, the international community holds the Lebanese state responsible for lacking the tools to implement it.
